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Recent congressional and media inquiries have highlighted questions regarding 
the protection provided to today‘s Marine Corps.  The purpose of this research is to 
analyze the current Family of Ballistic Protective Systems (FBPS) Acquisition Strategy 
of the United States Marine Corps.  The FBPS consists of individual protective items 
such as ballistic vests, individual armor plating, helmets, and eye and ear protection.  
Currently, the Marine Corps adheres to the (Department of Defense) DoD policy to use 
one-year appropriations to finance the procurement and sustainment of these items.  
Critics of the policy believe a separate three-year appropriation specific to the acquisition 
of these individual components better serves the customer and the acquisition process 
delineated in the DoD Instructions.  The research examined current government 
regulations, policy environment, and acquisition precedents.  Additionally, the research 
compared a previous FBPS acquisition to a theoretical procurement under three-year 
appropriations.  The research determined that the three-year obligation period of 
procurement funding better serves the acquisition process.  Furthermore, three-year 
appropriations provide a better value for the Marine Corps in terms of cost savings and a 
better product.  Finally, the research provides specific recommendations for the Marine 
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The Mirriam-Webster Dictionary defines war as ―a struggle or competition 
between opposing forces‖ (―War,‖ 2009).  In order to achieve victory in war, the struggle 
frequently requires men and women to use deadly force.  Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian 
military strategist, extended this idea when he stated, ―Warfare is merely a continuation 
of politics by other means‖ (as cited in Bassford, 2009).  Therefore, in the protection of 
its national interests, the United States developed the requirement for individual ballistic 
protection. 
The United States Marine Corps has a long history in individual ballistic 
protection.  The nickname ―Leatherneck,‖ given for the distinctive leather collar that 18th 
century Marines wore to protect their necks in battle, is one early example.  Today, the 
Marine Corps has consolidated each of these protective items into the Family of Ballistic 
Protective Systems (FBPS).  The FBPS consists of individual items such as ballistic 
vests, armor plating, helmets, and eye and ear protection.  Historically speaking, the 
service life of these items has decreased due to technological advances and increased 
operational tempo. 
Currently, the Department of Defense (DoD) has characterized all items 
comprising the FBPS as consumable items that require frequent replacement because of 
deterioration.  Therefore, the funding to both procure and maintain these items has 
consisted of primarily operations and maintenance funding or one-year appropriation.  
Additionally, the Department has also publicly stated that the FBPS does not represent a 
durable investment-grade item requiring procurement funding or three-year 
appropriation. 
Recent acquisitions of FBPS items have highlighted an opinion that one-year 
funding is not suitable to the acquisition process.  The current FBPS acquisition timeline 




staffing phase; second, a twelve-month research and development phase; third, an 
eighteen-month acquisition phase; and finally, a six-month testing and evaluation phase 
conducted concurrently with the acquisition phase. 
Also, congressional and media inquiries have raised questions regarding the 
FBPS—specifically, in regard to the timing and quality of products provided to today‘s 
Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine.  One must believe that both the media outlets and 
political leaders are acting on behalf of the concerned American taxpayer.  However, as 
with any significant modification of national policy, such as DoD FBPS funding policy, 
the political environment must also support the change. 
The transition of funding lines for the FBPS may allow for a more manageable 
process concerning financial management, but it may also create a better value for the 
Marine Corps.  Consequently, this research will attempt to examine the different aspects 
of this compelling question and provide a recommendation for the Marine Corps to 
employ.  However, since this type of equipment provides life-saving protection for 
America‘s most valuable national security asset, this analysis will not attempt to quantify 
the value of individual Service members. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the current FBPS acquisition strategy of 
the United States Marine Corps.  Currently, the Marine Corps adheres to the DoD policy 
to use one-year appropriations to finance the procurement and sustainment of these items.  
The policy does provide flexibility to financial managers when faced with competing 
fiscal requirements, but does the customer receive the best value?  Critics of the policy 
believe a separate three-year appropriation specific to the acquisition of these individual 
components would better serve the customer and the acquisition process and associated 






C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary question the research seeks to answer is should the Marine Corps use 
three-year appropriations to fund the procurement of items in the FBPS?  Each year, 
Congress appropriates funding for the DoD to purchase a myriad of items such as 
investments and repair parts.  Typical DoD purchases are ships for the Navy or aircraft 
for the Air Force.  On the other hand, operational funding supports the daily operations of 
the Department such as the repair of a vehicle‘s transmission.  As the Marine Corps plans 
for and conducts future procurements in the FBPS, should the Corps establish a new 
funding line for the FBPS?  The question requires examination from many different 
perspectives. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Prior to answering the primary research question, the research must answer a 
couple of secondary research questions.  Specifically: 
 Is it fiscally appropriate to use procurement funding to purchase the 
FBPS? 
 Which funding type provides the best value to the USMC? 
Several documents govern the administration of the DoD‘s funding.  Primarily, 
the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) determines the fiscal legality of how 
the Department and the component Services spend its money.  However, if the research 
can establish that the Marine Corps can use procurement funding to purchase items in the 
FBPS, then the research can compare each type of funding to analyze which provides the 
best value to the Marine Corps.  The comparison will ultimately serve to answer the 
primary research question. 
C. SCOPE 
The research focuses on assessing the current USMC acquisition strategy for the 




specific legal guidelines, the research analyzes which guidelines pertain to the FBPS.  
The assessment presents a historical recount of the latest deliberate body-armor 
acquisition for the Marine Corps utilizing one-year appropriation, and then presents a 
theoretical model of a FBPS procurement using three-year appropriation.  Finally, the 
research analyzes the costs and benefits associated with each appropriation, one-year and 
three-year, to provide a recommendation to the Marine Corps for future FBPS 
acquisitions. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a brief history of the FBPS and an 
overview of how the DoD and the Marine Corps currently fund body-armor acquisition.  
Furthermore, Chapter II provides a synopsis of the Marine Enhancement Program (MEP), 
which plays an important role in the acquisition of the FBPS. 
Next, Chapter III examines the fiscal legalities of procurement funding.  
Specifically, this chapter answers the question whether the FBPS represents a DoD 
investment or an operating expense.  Moreover, Chapter III examines recent budget 
history to determine if the DoD has set a precedent concerning this issue and whether the 
current political environment will support such a budget request. 
Chapter IV, Current USMC FBPS Funding Strategy, examines the Outer Tactical 
Vest (OTV) acquisition through the acquisition framework in order to provide a 
benchmark in which to compare a theoretical case.  Coincidently, the OTV acquisition 
was the last Marine Corps formal acquisition of body armor in the FBPS prior to the 
current trend of urgent need acquisitions. 
Chapter V presents a theoretical acquisition in the FBPS under procurement 
funding.  The final chapter, Conclusion, compares the two types of appropriations and 
attempts to answer the research questions.  The analysis includes an examination of the 
cost savings and product improvements that each type of appropriation provides while 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORY OF THE MARINE CORPS FBPS 
Historically, individual body armor has always been cumbersome—heavy and 
offering limited flexibility—and, consequently, not used in the early forms of combat.  In 
the last half century, the Marine Corps capitalized on the development of many new 
products for individual ballistic protection, and collectively, the sum of those components 
makes up the FBPS.  Serving as both a general force in readiness and providing forces for 
the joint environment, the Marine Corps has developed several specific FBPS 
requirements.  For this historical perspective, the research focuses on the equipment used 
by the entire population as opposed to equipment used by a specific community, such as 
force reconnaissance.   
The Marine Corps considers all aspects of personal ballistic protection to 
comprise a complete system.  In other words, a Marine must wear all components of the 
FBPS to achieve complete protection from the myriad of battlefield threats.  The next 
section provides a quick synopsis of the development of two components of the FBPS 
with the longest service life: body armor and helmets. 
1. Body Armor 
During World War II, United States military officials introduced troops to the 
―flak jacket,‖ a protective outer garment worn to guard against damage from low velocity 
projectiles known as flak (Global Security, 2009).  In May 1943, amid calls for industry 
to produce a light armor plate, the Dow Chemical Company ―laminated a fibrous glass 
fabric and plastic in a special manner that  provided encouraging ballistic values‖ (King, 
1953).  The Naval Research Laboratory constructed plates out of the resulting material, 
called Doron, and developed the first individual armored vest.  Two Navy Officers 
conducted a demonstration for the Marine Corps in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  One 




were amazing.  The Doron plating stopped the bullet and the result was the 
commencement of the Marine Corps Program to purchase body armor (King, 1953). 
In the final stages of the Battle of Okinawa, Congress approved the Marine Corps 
budget request to purchase enough body armor to equip an entire infantry battalion.  
Then, in 1948, the Marine Corps formally established a Body Armor Section under the 
Medical Research Laboratory in Camp Lejeune.  The director, Lieutenant Commander 
Fred Lewis, coordinated on behalf of the Marine Corps with the Office of the 
Quartermaster General and Naval Research Laboratory to determine the most suitable 
body-armor materials.  The result was a contoured Doron plate inserted into a vest known 
as the M-1951 (see Figure 1) (King, 1953).  The M-1951 was: 
7.75 lbs. and was a zippered sleeveless jacket constructed of water-
resistant nylon containing two types of armor. The first was a nylon 
basket-weave flexible pad, which covered the upper chest and shoulders. 
The other consisted of overlapping curved Doron plates which covered the 
wearers lower chest, back and abdomen.  The M-1951 vest also featured 
an exterior breast pocket and a reinforced eyeleted waist band. This 
allowed equipment which had the M-1910 hook fasteners to be attached to 
it, instead of a pistol belt. (Olive Drab, 2008a) 
The Marine Corps used the M-1951 extensively during the Korean War.  
Ultimately, the success of the vest led to a recommendation from the operating forces to 
procure enough to outfit an entire Marine Division for testing.  Subsequently, the 
operational employment of the Division changed, and the Marine Corps never purchased 





Figure 1.   Marine wearing the Marine Corps M-1951(From Medical Department, 1984) 
The next evolution in Marine Corps body armor was the M-1955 (see Figure 2).  
The M-1955 had the same technical characteristics of the M-1951, but the vest also 
featured ―a rope ridge fitted to the right shoulder so as to retain a slung rifle while on the 
march‖ (Olive Drab, 2008b).  The vest remained in the Marine Corps inventory from 
1953–1983.  Compared to the technology of today, the vest ―offered limited 
fragmentation protection but was better than the alternative of no vest at all‖ (Marine 
Corps Systems Command ICE, 2008, June 16, p. 3).  
 




In the 1970s, a breakthrough in individual body armor occurred when the DuPont 
Corporation developed Kevlar.  In 1981, the Marine Corps specified that its personnel 
must wear protective apparel, most of which contained Kevlar (Dupont, 2008).  
Subsequently, in 1983 the United States Marine Corps adopted a Kevlar-based flak jacket 
called the Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3.   Marine Corps PASGT(From Techmark Enterprises, n.d.) 
The PASGT offered ―improved fragmentation protection and comfort over its 
predecessor but was limited in direct fire protection and load carriage capability‖ (Marine 
Corps Systems Command, 2008).  The vest‘s technical characteristics include: 
13 plies of 14 oz/yd water repellent treated Aramid (Kevlar 29) fabric. The 
inner and outer cover, shoulder pads and front closure flap of the vest are 
water repellent treated 8 oz/yd2 (271 g/m2) ballistic nylon cloth. The vest 
has a 3/4 collar, pivoting shoulder pads, two front pockets, two grenade 
hangers and rifle butt patches at the front shoulder area. The front flap and 
pocket flaps have hook and loop fastener tape closures. The side overlaps 
are made flexible through the use of 1–1/2 inch (3.8 cm) wide elastic 
webbing. […] When the PASGT Vest is worn in combat areas, an 18–53 
percent decrease (threat dependent) in all fragmentation caused casualties 




The PASGT remained in the Marine Corps inventory until 1998, when the Marine 
Corps pursued the development of the next evolution in individual ballistic protection, 
known as the Family of Body Armor (FBA). 
The FBA consisted of three separate components, referred to collectively as the 
Interceptor System.  The concept of the system provided flexibility to Marine 
Commanders to vary the level of protection based on the perceived threat.  The FBA 
included an inner vest worn next to the body, an outer vest known as the OTV (see Figure 
4), and ballistic plates that a Marine can insert in the front and back of the OTV (Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command, 1995).   
 
Figure 4.   Marine Corps OTV(From ―Interceptor Body Armor,‖ n.d.) 
The OTV improved fragmentation and 9mm direct-fire protection and utilized 
armor plate inserts for rifle direct-fire protection.  The web strapping located on the 
outside of the vest improved the load carriage capability, and nylon side straps allowed 
for an adjustable fit (Marine Corps Systems Command, 2008).  The FBA acquisition was 
the last formal body- armor acquisition conducted by the Marine Corps; therefore, the 
Interceptor remains the program of record for Marine Corps body armor.  Chapter IV of 
this research provides a detailed account of the OTV acquisition.  The Marine Corps 
procured two other vests in response to the urgent needs of battlefield commanders, but 





During World War I, the Marine Corps developed the M-1917 Helmet (see Figure 
5).  Based on a British design, the M-1917: 
was made of 13 percent pressed manganese steel alloy, 0.035 inch thick, 
and could be ruptured only by a blow of 1,600 pounds or more. […] The 
ballistics specifications of the M1917 helmet required it to resist 
penetration by a 230-grain caliber .45 bullet with a velocity of 600 f.p.s. 
(Medical Department, 1984, p 642) 
 
Figure 5.   Marine Corps M-1917(From Medical Department, 1984) 
Although the M-1917 proved effective during combat, helmet research continued 
to develop a better alternative.  Then, in 1941, the Marine Corps adopted the M1 ―steel 
pot‖ Helmet (see Figure 6) (Medical Department, 1984). 
 
Figure 6.   Marine Corps M1(From Medical Department,  1984) 
The M1 weighed about three pounds and ―would resist penetration of 230-grain 
caliber .45 bullet with a velocity of 800 f.p.s.‖ (Medical Department, 1984, p. 644).  The 
M1 would remain in the Marine Corps inventory until approximately 1983.  With the 
invention of Kevlar, the same technology that applied to body armor applied to helmets.  






Figure 7.   Marine Corps PASGT Helmet(From Global Security, 2006a) 
The PASGT provided better head stability with an improved retention system 
(chinstrap) and headband design.  Additionally, the helmet came with a cover that 
allowed for better concealment during combat operations.  The PASGT remained in the 
inventory until 2003, when the Marine Corps replaced it with the Lightweight Helmet 
(LWH). 
The LWH (see Figure 8) ―retains the PASGT design but makes use of lighter 
materials made available by new technologies‖ (Marine Corps Systems Command, 
2008). 
 





B. DOD FUNDING OF FBPS 
As alluded to in the previous section, the Marine Corps often capitalizes on joint 
ventures into the research and development of FBPS.  Due to closely related mission 
needs, the Marine Corps and the Army often conduct joint ventures into both the research 
and development and the procurement of such products.  As an example, the M1 Helmet 
was a joint venture, led by the Army, and adopted by the Marine Corps (Medical 
Department, 1984).  A joint venture amongst the Services proves to save the DoD money 
by capitalizing on the economies of scale.  Since the Marine Corps and the Army use 
some of the same products, DoD can negotiate a lower unit price for a combined 
purchase vice a single service purchase.  Many acquisition professionals also refer to this 
combined purchase quantity as an economical order quantity since this practice decreases 
the ordering costs associated with the procurement. 
C. THE MARINE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 
During the hearings for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1990 and 1991, the Senate reported that: 
the Army and the Marine Corps emphasize research and development of 
sophisticated weapons systems at the expense of weapons and equipment 
for the individual soldier and marine. The committee believes that the 
effectiveness of our Nation's foot soldiers can be significantly increased 
through more aggressive efforts to identify and purchase, as well as 
develop, better weapons and equipment for our soldiers and marines. 
These efforts should include surveying foreign armies and commercial 
sources for items that can be procured off the shelf. 
We do not have to invent everything and have Army specifications or 
Marine specifications for every piece of equipment. We need to go ahead 
and make decisions and get some good equipment out there to the people 
who have to do the fighting if there ever is a war. 
The committee authorized $30 million in research and development funds 
for the Army and Marine Corps to develop lighter, more lethal infantry 
weapons; better, lighter antiarmor weapons; and improved field gear and 





The money provided by Congress to the Marine Corps during fiscal years 1991 
and 1992, $12 million collectively, established the Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).  
The initial years of the program focused on the research and development of MEP items. 
In fiscal year 1993, Congress authorized an additional $6 million for research and 
development and $8 million for procurement of MEP items.  The Marine Corps was 
required to report to Congress on the use of the funds, including an assessment of how 
the items increase the effectiveness of the individual Marine.  Also, in the report to 
Congress was a prioritized list of items and a funding profile for each item.  Finally, 
Congress directed the Marine Corps to coordinate efforts with the Army‘s Soldier 
Enhancement Program to eliminate any duplication of effort (United States Marine 
Corps, 1994). 
Because of the establishment of the MEP, the Marine Corps published a Mission 
Needs Statement for the program.  It stated that the program ―responded to two 
foundations of National Defense Policy:  Forward Presence and Crisis Response‖ (United 
States Marine Corps, 1993).  The statement also delineated the initial operational 
capability in FY96 with full operational capability in FY00. 
Subsequently, the Marine Corps established a process for compiling, prioritizing 





Figure 9.   Marine MEP Process Diagram (From Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, n.d.) 
The process begins with a proposed new initiative.  The initiative can come from 
a number of sources such as operational units, subject-matter experts or advisory groups.  
Quarterly in the fiscal year, the MEP working group (MWG) meets to review and 
approve or disapprove each new initiative.  The MWG comprises members from various 
Marine Corps Commands responsible for supporting the MEP and a member from the 
Soldier Enhancement Program.  The MWG approves, prioritizes and funds the initiatives 
for a material solution.  Ultimately, the program eliminates many of the required 







D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter provides an overview of the history, development and acquisition of 
the FBPS.  Since the major items in the FBPS comprise body armor and helmets, the 
historical context focused on those items specifically.  Furthermore, the DoD attains the 
best value of FBPS acquisitions by standardizing equipment to meet both USMC and 
Army service requirements, purchasing in a joint manner to decrease the total unit cost.  
Finally, the chapter provided a brief overview of the establishment and operation of the 











III. THE FISCAL LEGALITIES OF PROCUREMENT 
FUNDING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In most cases, the DoD classifies FBPS items as an expense cost and, therefore, 
provides funds using one-year appropriations.  Does the FBPS actually represent a DoD 
expense cost?  The DoD FMR gives a basic distinction between expense and investment 
costs by stating: 
The criteria for cost definitions consider the intrinsic or innate qualities of 
the item such as durability in the case of an investment cost or 
consumability in the case of an operating1 cost and the conditional 
circumstances under which an item is used or the way it is managed. […] 
All costs are classified as either an expense or an investment. (DoD, 2009, 
p 1–13) 
In the case of the FBPS, the Marine Corps adheres to the current DoD policy, but 
some critics believe the FBPS actually represents a DoD investment cost.  As with many 
policies, the environment often changes, causing the policy to become outdated.  
Regarding the FBPS, some believe this is the case, and an opportunity exists to reevaluate 
the existing policy.  In order to properly answer the question posed, the research must 
analyze the current DoD financial management regulations, consider if any DoD 
precedent exists, and understand the current policy environment. 
B. IS THE FBPS AN INVESTMENT OR AN EXPENSE? 
The FMR provides specific guidelines in determining the type of cost incurred by 




                                               





Table 1.   Expense/Investment Cost Determination (From DoD FMR, p 1–18) 
 
1. Does the USMC Centrally Manage FBPS? 
The first step in answering the question is to examine whether the DoD or one of 
the Services centrally manages the item in question.  The FMR defines centralized item 
management and asset control as: 
The management in the central supply system or a DoD-wide or Service-
wide acquisition and control system in which the manager has the 
authority for management and procurement of items of equipment. This 
includes such functions as requirement determination, distribution 
management, procurement direction, configuration control and disposal 
direction. Asset control includes the authority to monitor equipment 
availability and take such actions as necessary to restock to approved 
stockage levels. (DoD, 2009, p 1–51) 
A DoD-wide system for acquisition and control does not exist in the case of the 
FBPS.  Essentially, each service has the authority to budget, purchase and manage a 
specific product in order to conduct their mission. 
In the case of the Marine Corps, a service-wide acquisition and control system 
does exist.  Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) is the ―Commandant of the 
Marine Corps‘s principal agent for acquisition and sustainment of systems and equipment 




the MCSC, the Program Manager Infantry Combat Equipment (PM, ICE) established an 
armor and load-bearing team that ―is responsible to provide timely, high quality 
individual ballistic protection‖ (Marine Corps Systems Command, 2009).  PM, ICE 
serves as the Marine Corps FBPS manager and procurement authority.  The office 
establishes and implements policies on the distribution management, procurement 
direction, configuration control and disposal direction of all items in the FBPS. 
In an effort to assist MCSC in the central management of FBPS, the Marine Corps 
contracted Lion-Vallen Industries in 1992 to establish and maintain an Individual Combat 
Clothing and Equipment Consolidated Issue Facility (CIF).  The USMC authorized the 
construction of twenty separate warehouses in the United States and overseas to support 
the individual combat equipment requirements for the active component USMC.  The 
primary mission of the CIF is to ensure the Marines and Sailors ―are issued serviceable 
Individual Combat Equipment‖ (United States Marine Corps Consolidated Issue Facility, 
n.d.).  The CIF Web site also goes on to state that Lion-Vallen Industries is ―also 
responsible for managing the inventory and maintaining each individual account‖ (United 
States Marine Corps Consolidated Issue Facility, n.d.).  Furthermore, the contract allowed 
the MCSC to maintain real-time assets control using an automated database known as 
Total Asset Visibility.  Prior to the establishment of the CIF, the USMC relied upon each 
individual unit to account for, issue, repair and dispose of individual items.  Now, with 
the Lion-Vallen Industries contract, the MCSC can maintain central management of the 
FBPS from acquisition to disposal and all processes in between. 
The MCSC‘s central management of FBPS slightly degraded with the 
commencement of the global war on terrorism.  Although the MCSC established a 
strategic business model in 2000 to deal with the challenges of a changing environment, 
the events comprising the global war offered many new challenges.  Several Marines 
deployed in support of Central Command to conduct Operations Enduring and Iraqi 
Freedom.  As with any conflict, the enemy situation changed, and the threats posed to 
Marines evolved as well.  As a result, several DoD personnel purchased commercial body 




armor, the USMC published Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 262/07 on 
the purchase of individual body armor.  The MARADMIN stated that Marines and 
Sailors ―may not use commercial PPE2 in lieu of government tested, approved and issued 
PPE‖ (United States Marine Corps, 2007).  The new policy, announced by the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), essentially reinforced the MCSC‘s control of 
the FBPS in light of the recent media attention.  Individual commanders enforced the 
policy, and the USMC has maintained centralized item management and asset control 
over the FBPS ever since. 
2. Is the FBPS an Expense or an Investment? 
The FMR defines an expense as the ―costs of resources consumed in operating 
and maintaining the Department of Defense‖ (DoD, 2009, p 1–14).  As delineated in 
Table 1, the FMR provides specific guidelines to determine cost types, and the regulation 
even goes so far as to give several examples such as clothing is an expense.  
Traditionally, many have viewed the FBPS as a clothing item and, in keeping with the 
FMR, have classified it as an expense.  In addition, individual unit cost of the items in the 
family is below the DoD investment threshold of $250,000, despite the fact the Marine 
Corps expends several million dollars throughout the product life cycle to procure and 
maintain the FBPS.  Both of these notions lead many to believe the Marine Corps should 
classify the FBPS as an expense. 
The FMR defines an investment as ―the costs that result in the acquisition of, or 
an addition to, end items. These costs benefit future periods and generally are of a long-
term character such as real property and personal property‖ (DoD, 2009, p. 1–13).  Does 
the FBPS benefit future periods?  This is debatable since some components of the system 
do benefit future periods.  Specifically, individual ballistic vests, individual armor 
plating, and helmets can last several years, depending on use and contact with the enemy.  
Eye and ear protection are consumable items—they degrade very quickly—and do not 
generally benefit future periods.  However, since some components of the family can 
                                               




benefit future periods, the Marine Corps can consider the entire family to benefit future 
periods despite the fact that some items in the FBPS are consumable.  
In following the guidelines provided in Table 1, the FMR establishes the steps in 
determining whether FBPS is an expense or an investment.  The Marine Corps centrally 
manages FBPS, and does not purchase the FBPS using the Defense Working Capital 
Fund.  Therefore, according to the FMR, the FBPS is an investment, and the unit cost 
threshold of $250,000 is not a decision variable in determining whether FBPS is an 
expense or investment. 
C. HAS THE DOD SET A PRECEDENT IN THE PROCUREMENT OF 
THESE TYPES OF SYSTEMS? 
Often in breaking an existing policy or establishing a new policy, one poses the 
question of precedents.  The DoD, specifically the Marine Corps, has used procurement 
funding to purchase items within the FBPS.  The Marine Corps established this precedent 
during the acquisition of the Full Spectrum Battle Equipment (FSBE). 
On December 9, 1999, the 15th MEU conducted an amphibious training exercise 
in order to complete a special operations certification program.  During the mission, a 
CH-46 helicopter crashed off the coast of San Diego, California.  The crash killed seven 
of the eighteen individuals on board the aircraft (Piper, 2008).  The investigation of the 
crash highlighted several factors as the cause of death of these Marines and Sailors, one 
of which was the type of body armor used in these types of missions.  The body armor 
was heavy, non-buoyant, and not designed for quick removal in the case of an 
emergency.  As a result, the MCSC recognized the need for new body armor in support of 
Marines conducting special operations missions.  According to Exhibit P-40 of the 
Procurement Marine Corps Budget Estimate for FY 2003, the Marine Corps budgeted a 
total of $7 million for FSBE.  The incremental purchase was to occur in FY03 and FY04, 
in the amounts of $4 and $3 million respectively (DoN, 2002).  Consequently, the Marine 
Corps completed the procurement in FY 2004, and the MCSC spent $6.8 million for 




As discussed in Chapter II, the original justification for the use of procurement 
appropriations for the FSBE was the MEP.  Coincidently, the MEP is how the USMC 
supports the procurement of other items in the FBPS.  Since the entire program has 
acquisition preapproval from Congress, the MEP eliminates some of the acquisition 
documentation required, such as the Mission Needs Statement.  Further analysis of the 
FSBE program concludes that the USMC is still utilizing procurement funding for the 
FSBE, thus the precedent is still intact. 
D. EXISTING POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The legislative branch of the government has also provided ammunition to the 
current argument in their consistent intervention and oversight.  Section 142 of the 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20093 required the 
DoD to provide a response to the Congressional Defense Committees on the body-armor 
acquisition strategy.  Specifically, the law asked for ―an assessment of the feasibility and 
advisability of establishing a separate, dedicated procurement line item for the acquisition 
of body armor and associated components for FY11 and for each fiscal year thereafter‖ 
(Under Secretary of Defense, 2009, p 14).  In response, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics John Young stated that: 
The Department does not believe that establishing a separate, dedicated 
procurement line item for body armor is desirable.  Body armor is an 
integral piece of the war fighter‘s uniform which is characterized as a 
consumable item along with other items such as personal protective gear, 
fuel, and food.  Since body armor is an issued item that periodically must 
be replaced due to wear and tear, it does not represent a durable, 
investment-grade item.  Therefore, purchases of body armor are 
consistently funded as an operational cost with Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) funds by units within the military departments. 
Funding body armor with O&M funds provides more flexibility to shift 
funds and cover shortfalls or requirement changes in allocations for body 
armor.  Procurement funds are not always as readily available as O&M 
funds at the beginning of a fiscal year (not receiving funds in procurement 
up front in some cases), thereby leaving the requirement for body armor 
                                               




"unfunded" for some length of time until the procurement portion of a 
supplemental is approved. Procurement is usually based on a fixed number 
of the procurement purchase line, which fails to allow for changes in 
required body armor quantities, should those numbers be increased beyond 
the appropriated amount.  The type of body armor and quantity flexibility, 
and repetitive, consumable nature of body armor purchases, is better suited 
to O&M funding. 
Whether a program is funded out of procurement or O&M will not 
determine the long range strategic plan for sustaining the body armor 
industry.  War fighter acquisition needs for body armor change from one 
year to the next and may require timely and near term, un-planned 
funding.  This is consistent with U.S. Central Command's requests to raise 
the expense/investment threshold above $250,000 because the normal 
procurement funding process is too slow to meet immediate and emergent 
combat procurement requirements.  Use of O&M funding to purchase 
body armor allows the military departments to maintain acquisition 
flexibility to meet their near term objectives to respond to emerging 
threats. (Under Secretary of Defense, 2009, pp 9–10) 
Subsequently, Representative Niki Tsongas, member of the House Armed 
Services Committee, presumably disagreed with the Under Secretary‘s assessment.  On 
May 19, 2009, she introduced HR 2473 that would take effect in FY11 and each fiscal 
year thereafter.  The bill states, ―the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that within the 
procurement account for each of the military services a separate, […] dedicated program 
element is assigned to the procurement of body armor. (US House of Representatives, 
2009).  Her coinciding press release states: 
Currently, our armed services draw funding for body armor from a general 
account that funds a vast array of military technology and equipment.  By 
devoting specific accounts to body armor development and procurement, 
we can more easily address shortcomings with the current body armor 
program and promote the development of body armor that is best suited to 
protecting our soldiers against current threats. (Tsongas, 2009) 
The bill is currently before the House Armed Services Committee and 
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces for referral.  One can infer that the DoD has not 
convinced all members of Congress of the argument, and the political environment 




E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In conclusion, according to the DoD FMR, the USMC meets all the specific 
guidelines to use procurement funding to purchase the FBPS.  The Marine Corps 
centrally manages the FBPS and does not purchase using the Defense Working Capital 
Fund.  Therefore, according to the FMR, the USMC can classify the FBPS as an 
investment.  Furthermore, the DoD, and the USMC, has established precedents in this 
arena by purchasing the FSBE with procurement funding.  The MEP provided the initial 
justification for the purchase of the FSBE, and this same justification supports the 
purchase of the FBPS.  Finally, the current policy environment supports a break from the 
existing policy, and a bill in the United States House of Representatives is currently in 
referral.  In a recent 60 Minutes interview, Katie Couric asked the Secretary of the 
Defense Gates what changes he wanted to make in the culture at the Pentagon.  He 
answered by saying "I want a part of this building that comes to work every single day, 
asking themselves, ‗What can I do to help the soldier in the field today? What can I do to 
make them successful in the field and bring ‗em home safely?‘‖ (Gates, 2009).  A change 




IV. CURRENT USMC FBPS FUNDING STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally speaking, defense acquisition programs comprise a series of costs: 
research, development, testing, evaluation, investment, operations, maintenance and 
disposal costs.  Figure 10 gives a graphical depiction of how the DoD incurs these costs 
throughout the lifecycle of a system. 
Figure 10.   LifeCycle Costs of an Acquisition Project (Mislick, 2009) 
In the case of FBPS, the investment costs are the subject of this research.  
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) and operation costs are 
inconsequential to the type of funding used to procure ballistic protection.  However, as 
the research question states, which type of funding, one-year or three-year, provides a 




Since the commencement of the global war on terrorism, the Marine Corps 
funded the most recent FBPS purchases using supplemental appropriations.  The urgent 
and compelling need for this equipment justified this method of funding, but, in order to 
provide a baseline comparison, it is necessary to analyze an actual budgeted procurement 
versus an urgent acquisition.  Therefore, this chapter presents a traditional budgeted 
procurement case, utilizing one-year appropriations, in the FBPS.  The FBA, known as 
the Interceptor System (see Figure 4), is a sufficient example for providing this baseline 
comparison.  Although the Interceptor System comprises three distinct parts, the research 
will focus specifically on the acquisition of the OTV.  Additionally, the production phase 
is of primary concern for the comparison, but the research presents the other phases of 
acquisition as background to the FBA acquisition. 
One caveat to the presentation of the OTV acquisition is the current DoD 
acquisition model is slightly different than the one authorized for use during the OTV 
procurement.  Figure 11 provides a comparison of the OTV acquisition framework to that 
of the current model used today.  Although the terminology is slightly different, the 






























































Figure 11.   Comparison of OTV acquisition framework to current acquisition framework 
(After Petross, 2009) 
B. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION AND STAFFING PHASE 
Several strategic documents outline the major operational requirements for the 
FBA acquisition.  These documents include the National Defense Policy, National 
Military Strategy, and the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1994–2004. 
According to the OTV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) the 
procurement ―responds to two elements of National Defense Policy: Forward Presence 
and Crisis Response‖ (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1995, p. 1).  
Intrinsically, these two elements require Marines to defend national interests with the use 
of deadly force in areas in which individuals are susceptible to small arms and light 
machine-gun rounds.  Furthermore, the threat of artillery and tank-delivered shrapnel 
rounds exist as well. 
The United States National Military Strategy calls for each Service to ―provide 




continuum‖ (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1995, p. 1).  For Marines, 
the concept of the ―Three Block War‖ would best describe the operational requirement 
described above.  General C.C. Krulak, the 31st CMC, described the modern battlefield as 
one in which a ―Strategic Corporal‖ leads his small unit in full-scale combat, 
peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance operations in three contiguous city blocks 
(Krulak, 1999).  The combination of these operations represents the entire operational 
continuum.   
Finally, the MCMP established a ―roadmap‖ for the USMC in the years ahead, 
and ―It defines objectives and required capabilities to support the National Military 
Strategy and meet our global requirements‖ (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 
1993, p. 1–1).  The MCMP established a list of actions to implement in accordance with 
the twenty DoD mission areas.  Specifically, Mission Area 23, Close Combat called for 
the fielding of ―an integrated suite of lightweight individual equipment which improves 
the survivability and comfort in all environments‖ (Headquarters United States Marine 
Corps, 1993, p. II–21). 
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), the Marine Corps 
command responsible for drafting the ORD for the FBA, established three key 
performance parameters for the OTV: weight, fragmentation protection, and area of 
coverage.  The ORD established objective and threshold values for each parameter.  In 
the case of weight, the objective was 2.27 kilograms (5 pounds) and the threshold was 
3.85 kilograms (8.5 pounds).  The MCCDC based the objective values for the protection 
parameter on the existing battlefield threat.  The area of coverage objective was similar to 
the PASGT, or 6.75 square feet for a medium vest (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 1995). 
The MCCDC also established some additional thresholds regarding the wear and 
use of the OTV.  These included: 
 Fit a Marine falling within the 5th and 95th percentile of height 
and weight 





 Not prevent a Marine from performing normal tasks, to include 
effective employment of infantry weapons 
 Capable of being worn under the All-purpose Lightweight 
Individual Carrying Equipment (ALICE) system and future load 
bearing equipment 
 Made of non-corrosive materials with a dull/non-reflective finish 
 Fungus resistant 
 Not degraded by petroleum, oil and lubricant 
 Require no user maintenance other than normal care and cleaning 
 Not require an increase in support personnel or maintenance levels 
 Fully capable under all environmental conditions including 
tropical, desert, temperate, arctic, maritime, rain, snow, fog, dust, 
sand, high relative humidity, high temperature, and ice. 
 Capable of being donned and adjusted to fit in 30 seconds 
(threshold), 15 seconds (objective). (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 1995, pp. 3–4) 
Initially, the Marine Corps planned to purchase 122,382 OTVs in support of the 
active component using Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&MMC) funds; 
but MCCDC published a change to the ORD in 1998 that increased the requirement to 
172,200.  The Marine Corps later settled on 150,328 as the acquisition objective in 2004 
(Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1995). 
C. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND EVALUATION PHASE 
As is common among the Services, the Marine Corps capitalized on an emerging 
Army project to develop a modular body armor and load-bearing vest.  Concurrently, the 
Marine Corps tasked the Natick Laboratory Army Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center (NRDEC) to develop an improved PASGT—complete with armor 
plating—as a low-risk secondary option to the Army modular vest.  The NRDEC 
conducted a field user evaluation with prototypes of each vest, and although the users did 
not completely endorse one vest over the other, the users did desire certain components 
of each vest.  Consequently, the Marine Corps diverged from the Army vest and tasked 





The NRDEC completed the development of the prototype hybrid vest and 
presented the vest to industry for a possible government contract.  Concurrent with the 
request for an industry proposal, the NRDEC conducted another user evaluation to 
validate the design.  A driving force behind the swift development of the OTV was 
General Krulak‘s improvement initiative.  General Krulak, the CMC from 1995 to 1999, 
made the vest one of the top priorities for the Marine Corps, and it moved quickly 
through the initial stages of the acquisition process.  At this point, the Army became 
interested in the hybrid vest, and they proposed a joint acquisition.  Although the joint 
venture would take some cooperation by both Services, this would allow for some overall 
program savings due to the economical order quantity (Townes, 2009). 
The OTV was designated an ACAT IVT program, which is defined as ―does not 
meet the criteria for ACAT III or above and requires operational test and evaluation, 
RDT&E total expenditure of less than $140 million in FY 2000 constant dollar‖ (Marine 
Corps Systems Command, 2007, p. 30). 
In the case of body armor, military specifications, such as Mil-A-46100D, 
establish criteria for thickness ranges and test projectiles for first article testing.  For the 
OTV, V50 protection ballistic limit is used.  The V50 test limit is: 
the average of 6 fair impact velocities comprising the three lowest 
velocities resulting in complete penetration and the three highest velocities 
resulting in partial penetration. A maximum spread of 150 feet per second 
shall be permitted between the lowest and highest velocities employed in 
determination of ballistic limits. (DoD, 2007, p. 19) 
A series of fragment masses, ranging from 2 to 64 grains, established the 
parameter threshold.  The threshold established a minimum velocity at which the OTV 
would protect an individual from fragmentation.  The Marine Corps conducted multiple 
tests in both the development and production of the OTV. 
The operational requirements document addressed the scheduling considerations 
of the OTV acquisition by stating: 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is desired during FY 96, required 




forces, schools and training organizations, reserve forces, and other 
supporting establishments.  IOC will be attained when fielding has been 
completed to one regiment in each Marine Division.  Full Operational 
Capability is desired by FY 99, required by FY 00 and will be attained 
when fielding to the active forces and schools and training organizations 
has been completed. (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
1995, p. 5) 
The MCSC was the milestone decision authority for the OTV acquisition.  The 
Assistant CMC approved the operational requirements document on January 5, 1995.  
Acquisition Milestones I and II occurred on the same day, December 30, 1996.  
Furthermore, a low rate initial production decision occurred on July 15, 1998.  The 
Marine Corps awarded Point Blank Body Armor ―a five year, firm fixed price contract 
with indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity options‖ (Program Manager, Combat Support 
and Logistics Equipment, 1998, p. 5).  The program manager originally designated the 
performance, cost and schedule risks as low.  Additionally, the OTV could see as much 
as a 20% price reduction with a waiver of the Berry Amendment or the requirement to 
use domestic materials.  The price reduction correlated to a $27.5 million savings through 
the life of the contract (Program Manager, Combat Support and Logistics Equipment, 
1998).  As is typical in these types of contracts, the Marine Corps designated both a 
minimum and maximum quantity of vests for procurement.  Immediately upon awarding 
the contract in July, a contractor protest occurred.  The situation was not resolved until 
the GAO ruled in the government‘s favor in October 1999.  Finally, in April 1999, 
Milestone III occurred (Townes, 2009). 
D. PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
Once Milestone III occurred, the program moved to the production and 
deployment phase.  Table 2 shows the original budgeted cost and expenditure schedule 
for O&MMC Funds.  The Marine Corps designated a corresponding fielding plan that 






Table 2.   Budgeted Cost and Expenditure Schedule for O&MMC Initial Issue (After 






















172,200 $4430 $10398 $5448 $7725 $7895 $8441 $8213 $10922 $63472 $87822 ($24350) 
 
Although data exist for the total cost of the program, it is very difficult to 
corroborate the figures in Table 2 on a yearly basis by utilizing public sources.  
Consequently, depending upon your perspective, this is one of the advantages, or 
disadvantages, of utilizing one-year appropriations.  O&MMC, the appropriation used for 
the FBPS, consists of specific budget activities.  These budget activities divide into 
activity groups, which fund subactivity groups.  For the FBPS the budget activity is 
―Operating Forces‖ (01), the activity group is ―Expeditionary Forces‖ (1A), and the 
subactivity group is ―Operational Forces‖ (1A1A).  In all public documents, the 
O&MMC budget only publishes the total amount for each respective group, not the 
specific amount for FBPS. 
The development baseline objective and threshold amounts for the OTV 
acquisition were $61,191,000 ($FY96) and $64,250,550 ($FY96) respectively.  Due to 
the change in the acquisition objective in 1998, the production baseline increased to the 
respective amounts of $83,269,963 ($FY96) and $91,596,959 ($FY96).  In 2004, the 
Marine Corps settled on a new acquisition objective, which changed the total costs to 
$69,798,132 ($FY96) and $76,777,945 ($FY96) (Program Manager, Infantry Combat 
Equipment, 2004).  Throughout the production process, slight modifications in the 
product were possible. 
E. DEFENSE FUNDING THROUGHOUT THE OTV ACQUISITION 
Table 3 provides the dates of the various DoD Appropriations Acts from FY96-
FY05, the duration of the procurement.  The Table highlights the laws that Congress 




Table 3.   Dates for the DoD Appropriations Acts Ranging from FY96-05 (After Pentagon 
Library, 2009) 
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 
12-1-95 9-30-96 10-8-97 10-17-98 10-25-99 8-9-00 1-10-02 10-23-02 9-20-03 1-20-04 
 
In the years highlighted in Table 3, Congress enacted a continuing resolution that 
provided funding as a rate of spending with various restrictions, such as no new programs 
are to be started (Potvin, 2009).  The continuing resolution consistently loomed over the 
OTV acquisition, and several individuals noted that it was very difficult to maintain an 
efficient production line when the money for the program was uncertain.  Accordingly, 
an inefficient production line leads to a slowing of or even a stop in production that can 
lead to increased costs. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The OTV served as the last budgeted Marine Corps procurement of body armor 
using one-year appropriations.  The nature of the procurement required multiple contracts 
despite cooperation from another Service.  However, the funding of the procurement was 
difficult since several continuing resolutions of the Defense Appropriations Act made the 
funding inconsistent.  Although difficult to quantify, the added challenges of using one-








V. THEORETICAL FBPS FUNDING UTILIZING A THREE-YEAR 
APPROPRIATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Practical Financial Management Guide defines an appropriation as ―the 
authority provided by an Act of Congress to incur obligations for specified purposes and 
to make payments out of the Treasury‖ (Potvin, 2009, p. 75).  As discussed in the 
previous chapters, these appropriations come in many different forms based on their 
purpose, amount and time restrictions.  Specifically, this chapter will address the 
theoretical acquisition of FBPS using three-year appropriations.  Figure 12 provides a 
graphical representation of specific appropriation terminology. 
 
Figure 12.   Procurement Terminology (After Potvin, 2009) 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The research developed a theoretical schedule utilizing procurement funding, but 
a few assumptions exist.  First, since several components of Headquarters Marine Corps 
are required in order to complete an acquisition, the research assumed that the process 
began with the receipt of the requirement for a new product.  Specifically, the research 





contracting and production of the FBPS item.  In other words, the schedule commences 
with the reception of the requirement, in the form of a Capabilities Development 
Document, from the MCCDC. 
Second, the research assumes that the Marine Corps is the only service 
conducting the procurement.  Although some cost savings may exist in a joint acquisition 
with another service, the schedule does not account for the additional coordination 
required to conduct a joint acquisition. 
C. SCHEDULE 
Figure 13 provides a theoretical Gantt chart on the acquisition of the Next 
Generation Body Armor System.  The theoretical schedule calls for 937 days from receipt 
of the requirement to fully operation capable.  Specifically, items one through twenty-
three will require RDT&E funding.  Once Milestone C is complete, three-year 
appropriations are used.  One should note items 25 through 37.  For each one of these 
items, some inherent flexibility exists because the appropriation has a longer obligation 
period.  Therefore, more detailed testing may occur, or the MCSC may extend the request 
for proposal to allow industry to push the capabilities of the current technology. 
Another key point pertains to contracting.  The contracting process is tedious and 
although the chart simplifies it for graphical representation, the fact remains that the 
flexibility achieved using procurement funding allows for unforeseeable circumstances.  
For example, in the OTV, a contract protest stopped progress on the program and 
possibly jeopardized the fielding of the vest to the customer.  While using procurement 



































The research intended to analyze the issue of FBPS funding from several different 
perspectives to answer the primary and secondary research questions.  These perspectives 
included fiscal law, acquisition timing, cost savings and which appropriation type 
produces the best product.  While compiling data to conduct the analysis, the researcher 
interviewed experts in each subject to gain a complete perspective of the issues 
associated with the FBPS funding.  The research also investigated several public 
documents for evidence to support the conclusions presented.  The research also 
developed a theoretical acquisition of the FBPS using three-year appropriations, which it 
compared to a previous procurement using one-year appropriations.   
Ultimately, the research intended to compile all the facts regarding this complex 
issue into a succinct presentation to assist the nation‘s leadership in analyzing this issue.  
As stated by the Secretary of Defense, it is the responsibility of each member of the DoD 
to ensure that the operating forces get the best equipment needed to accomplish their 
mission.  Although financial management of FBPS may seem unimportant when faced 
with the task of fighting two wars, this type of analysis may lead to a competitive 
advantage over our adversaries and success on the battlefield. 
B. ONE-YEAR APPROPRIATION VS. THREE-YEAR APPROPRIATION 
Other than the obvious difference of obligation periods, advantages and 
disadvantages exist for each type of appropriation.  One advantage to annual 
appropriations is the flexibility in terms of the purpose of the appropriation.  Typically, 
the DoD uses annual appropriations to operate the Department and purchase expense-
type items.  However, flexibility in annual appropriations translates to an ability to 
obligate funds from within the appropriation and to purchase another higher priority item 
within that appropriation.  Conversely, procurement funding is limited in its ability to 




case of the FSBE acquisition, the Marine Corps specifically designated an exact amount 
of vests to purchase.  Consequently, Congress strictly regulates this amount and prohibits 
the Marine Corps from spending this money on anything other than the FSBE. 
Another advantage to annual appropriations is the level of detail provided in the 
budget request to Congress.  As stated in the acquisition of the OTV, specific 
documentation is not required in the budget preparation of annual appropriations.  The 
FMR only requires a request for the total amount versus each specific line item.  
However, since body armor is such an important issue to Congress, inquiries often arise.  
These inquiries have led to preparation of many informal documents similar to that 
required for procurement funding budget request.  On the other hand, three-year 
appropriations require specific documentation for how the Service intends to expend the 
money and for how many systems the appropriation will purchase.  In some cases, a 
detailed work breakdown structure is required for the procurement.  Additionally, an 
update is required in the subsequent budget years to document the progress in the 
acquisition. 
An advantage to procurement funding is that the three-year obligation period 
better serves acquisition timing.  Typically, an acquisition requires three to five years to 
complete.  As discussed in the previous chapter, procurement funding provides the 
Marine Corps with more time to complete each phase of this process.  In opposition, one-
year appropriations can complicate the acquisition schedule, considering the time 
required to complete the purchase process before the money actually expires.   
Another advantage to procurement funding is the risk associated with competing 
requirements.  Once the appropriation is law, the treasury funds the program, and unless a 
Congressional transfer or reprogram occurs, the funding will remain.  For one-year 
appropriations, the level at which this reprogramming occurs is delegated to financial 






C. BEST VALUE 
1. Cost Savings 
It is difficult to quantify which appropriation provides the best value in terms of 
cost savings, but some assumptions on certain cost factors do exist.  Since annual 
appropriations are not conducive to acquisition timing, some have suggested that 
compromises occur in order to utilize the funding before it expires.  Typically, these 
compromises occur in the testing and user evaluation arenas.  Consequently, the Marine 
Corps fields a product, and then user modifications are noted.  Oftentimes, the 
manufacturer can easily solve these problems, but in some extreme cases, a redesigned 
test and evaluation must occur; this is where the increased costs of using annual 
appropriations occur. 
If the Marine Corps were to use three-year appropriations, these increased costs 
still may occur, but they are less likely.  As noted in the procurement schedule, more 
flexibility exists in the schedule, and the existing pressure to obligate the appropriation 
decreases. 
2. Better Product 
As noted several times in the research, annual appropriations consistently carry an 
added pressure to compete within the acquisition schedule.  This pressure translates into 
compromises in the design of the FBPS.  Although the Marine Corps does an outstanding 
job in the current policy environment to account for schedule mishaps, unforeseen 
problems do occur.  Additionally, as the research has noted, Congress has had a difficult 
time allowing the DoD the full budget year to obligate the funds. 
Procurement funding, on the other hand, allows the Marine Corps to operate 
under a more suitable timeline concerning product acquisition.  Since program managers 
have an extended obligation period with three-year appropriations, the additional time 
translates to fewer compromises and more in depth testing and evaluation in the earlier 






The research strongly supports the proposition that legally, the Marine Corps can 
treat FBPS as a DoD investment and, therefore, procure using three-year appropriations.  
Additionally, precedents have been set in this particular area of acquisition, and the 
policy environment will support this radical idea.  A comparison between an annual 
appropriation acquisition and a theoretical three-year appropriation also concludes that 
procurement funding better suits the acquisition timeline.   
However, several considerations regarding switching funding lines exist.  First, 
since the Marine Corps currently funds FBPS using O&MMC appropriations, different 
documentation is required in procurement funding.  The documentation required is more 
detailed than is currently provided to Congress.  Therefore, the Marine Corps must 
slightly modify the existing budgeting process to account for this change.   
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACQUISITIONS 
1. The Marine Corps should use Three-Year Appropriations to Procure 
Future Items in the FBPS 
Procurement funding provides the flexibility for acquisition professionals to 
provide the best value to the Marine Corps for new products in the FBPS.  In addition, 
the visibility provided to Congress in the planning, programming and budgeting phases 
eliminates the additional requirements that have fallen on the Marine Corps during the 
execution phase of federal budgeting. 
2. The Marine Corps Should Continue to Budget O&M Appropriations 
to Maintain the FBPS 
Just as the Marine Corps would operate and sustain any other program purchased 
using three-year appropriations, the Marine Corps should treat the FBPS the same way.  
Primarily, the sustainment would pertain to replacement parts for existing products and 





3. The Marine Corps Should Maintain the Integrity of the FBPS 
Since the FBPS comprises a system, it is imperative that the Marine Corps 
maintain this integrity.  It would be difficult to account for each individual item in the 
FBPS, especially if financial mangers use different funding lines for product 
procurement.  It is the opinion of this research that the Marine Corps must maintain the 
system integrity in order to take full advantage of procurement funding for the FBPS. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Many different opportunities exist for future research in the FBPS, particularly an 
analysis of new types of equipment and products available for ballistic protection.  Many 
news articles have highlighted the increased fighting load that an individual wears during 
combat operations.  Therefore, an investment in lighter, more durable materials benefits 
the individual on the ground.  From a financial management perspective, a detailed cost 
estimation of some of the alternatives existing in the commercial market may prove 
valuable.  Essentially, this would compare the costs and benefits of each alternative to 








LIST OF REFERENCES 




Bassford, C. (2009, May 22). Frequently asked questions about Clausewitz. Retrieved 
July 2009, from  http://www.clausewitz.com/FAQs.htm#Ideas 
 
Department of Defense (DoD) (2007, July 13). Detail specification armor plate, steel, 
wrought, high hardness (Mil-A-46100D). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Department of Defense (DoD). (2009). Financial management regulation (DoD 
Instruction 7000.14). Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller). 
 
Department of the Navy. (DoN). (2002). Procurement Marine Corps budget estimate FY 
2003. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Department of the Navy (DoN). (2004). Procurement Marine Corps budget estimate FY 
2005. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Dupont. (2008). History of Kevlar® in life protection. Retrieved February 21, 2009, from  
http://www2.dupont.com/Kevlar/en_US/products/history.html 
 
Gates, R. (2009, May 17). Bob Gates, America's Secretary of War. 60 Minutes. 
[Interview with Katie Couric]. 
 
Global Security. (2005, April 26). National defense authorization act for fiscal years 




Global Security. (2006a, January 15). PASGT helmet. Retrieved July 2009, from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/pasgt.htm 
 
Global Security. (2006b, January 15). PASGT Vest. Retrieved July 2009, from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/pasgtv.htm 
 






Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. (1993, July 21). Marine Corps Master Plan 
(MCMP) 1994–2004. Washington, DC. Author. 
 
Interceptor Body Armor. (n.d.). Wikimedia. Retrieved July 2009, from 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/3/32/Interceptor_body_armor.jpg 
 
King, L. (1953, March-April). Lightweight body armor. Retrieved July 2009, from 
http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/lightweight_body_armor.htm 
 
Krulak, C.C. (1999, January). The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block 
War. Retrieved July 2009, from 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm 
 
Lara, L and Carney, B (2009, June 23). Armor and Load Bearing Team, Marine Corps 
Systems Command [Interview with researcher]. 
 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (n.d.). Marine enhancement program. 
Retrieved July 2009, from 
https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/featuretopics/mep/policy.html 
 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (1995, January 5). Operational 
Requirements Document for the family of body armor. Quantico, VA: Author. 
 
Marine Corps Systems Command. (2007, March 16). Command overview. Retrieved June 
2009, from http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/aboutus/ 
 
Marine Corps Systems Command. (2007, April). Project Team Leaders Pocket Guide. 
Quantico, VA: Author. 
 
Marine Corps Systems Command. (2008, October 15). Lightweight helmet. Retrieved 




Marine Corps Systems Command. (2009, April 1). Armor and load bearing team. 
Retrieved June 2009, from  
http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/pmice/Armor.asp 
 
Marine Corps Systems Command, Infantry Combat Equipment (ICE). (2008, June 16). 
USMC body armor. Briefing. Presented to the SME Weekly Focus Group at 
Marine Corps Base Quantico. 
 
Medical Department, United States Army. (1984). Wound ballistics. Washington, DC: 




Mislick, G. (2009, July 20). Operations Analysis. Briefing. Presented to the Cost 
Estimation students (OA4702) at Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Olive Drab. (2008a, May 22). Body armor (flak jackets) post WW II. Retrieved July 2009, 
from http://www.olive-drab.com/od_soldiers_gear_body_armor_korea.php 
 
Olive Drab. (2008b, May 22). Vietnam Flak Vest. Retrieved Nov 2009, from 
            http://www.olive-drab.com/od_soldiers_gear_body_armor_vietnam.php 
 
Pentagon Library. (2008, July). Defense Appropriations Law.appropriations law. 
Retrieved September 2009, from 
http://www.whs.mil/library/defenseappropriations.htm 
 
Petross, D. (2009, March 30). Introduction to Program Management. Briefing. Presented 
to the Principles of Acquisition and Program Management students (MN3331) at 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Piper, S.S. (2008, February 7). SWET: Training Marines hope to never use. Retrieved 
June 2009, from 
http://www.marines.mil/units/marforcom/iimef/26thmeu/Pages/JAN081.aspx 
 
Potvin, L. (2009). Practical Financial Management. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
 
Program Manager, Combat Support and Logistics Equipment. (1998). Acquisition 
strategy for the family of body armor. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Systems 
Command. 
 
Program Manager, Infantry Combat Equipment. (2004) Acquisition Program Baseline. 
Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Systems Command. 
 
Special Warfare. (n.d.). Armor, body, fragmentation, protective, upper torso, with 3/4 
collar M-1955. Retrieved July 2009, from http://www.special-
warfare.net/data_base/303_protective/m1955_armor_01.html 
 
Techmark Enterprises. (n.d.). Body armor. Retrieved July 2009, from 
www.specwargear.com/images/armor 
 
Townes, D. (2009, July 21). Interceptor Program Manager, NRDEC. [Interview with 
researcher]. 
 
Tsongas, R.N. (2009, May). Tsongas introduces legislation to improve body armor for 





Under Secretary of Defense. (2009). Department of Defense report to Congress on the 
body armor aquisition strategy. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
 
United States Marine Corps. (1993). Mission need statement for the Marine 
enahancement program. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command. 
 
United States Marine Corps. (1994, September 8). Policy for the Marine enhancement 
program (MCO 3900.16). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
United States Marine Corps. (2007). Marine Corps policy on the wear and purchase of 
body armor (MARADMIN 262/07). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
United States Marine Corps Consolidated Issue Facility. (n.d.). Frequently asked 
questions. Retrieved June 2009, from http://www.usmccif.com/default.htm 
 
U.S. House of Representatives. (2009). A bill to improve the Department of Defense 
policies on body armor (HR 2473). Washington, DC: Author. 
 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 
 Camp Pendleton, California 
 
7. Program Manager, Infantry Combat Equipment 
 Marine Corps Systems Command 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
8. Acquisition Research Program 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
9. Diana Petross 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
10. Professor Joseph San Miguel 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
11. Major Jason Freeby 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
